Complexities & Challenges of Cooperation to Provide Security At Sea

By Timothy A. Martin (copyright 2011)

Abstract

In the post-Cold War era, maritime security changed from emphasizing strategic deterrence to focusing more on regions and non-traditional facets. Greater weight was given to international law and cooperation between states. In the post-Cold War era, states could choose security partners. Nevertheless, cooperation between states to provide security at sea was still a sensitive and complex aspect of international relations. This research compares cooperative security behaviour of states within two regions by focusing on law enforcement at sea, a non-traditional facet of maritime security, and by questioning the significance of confidence building in facilitating maritime security cooperation. Cooperation is possible if proposed agreements have an underlying coherent, formal, and consensus-built legal framework supporting region-specific and regionally-built mechanisms. From a perspective of security regime building, when not burdened by Cold War priorities and a bi-polarised international security structure, states will agree to principles, rules, and norms that control their behaviour when they are confident that their sovereignty will be respected and that such cooperation aligns with their national security interests. A comparative analysis builds on existing regime theory, examining the evolving security environment, and asking; what are the influencing factors leading states toward maritime security cooperation, and what factors keep them apart?



[An edited version of this paper - originally a post-graduate thesis - continues below. A methodology chapter has been omitted to keep things simple but is available on request: tim.martin@deakin.edu.au ]

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter One

By Timothy A. Martin (copyright 2011) 

1.1 Introduction 

In the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, as the bi-polar superpower security structure ended in 1989-91, changes in the nature of security affected how states cooperated to enforce law at sea. Enforcing law at sea is a specific activity conducted by armed marine authorities such as navy, coast guard, or water police and is a non-traditional facet of international maritime security. [2] Law enforcement at sea is the practice of pursuing, intercepting, boarding and searching vessels, making arrests where necessary. It is an activity that often takes place outside state territories, and is subject to international maritime law, Consequently, international law enforcement at sea raises questions about authority, jurisdiction and the territorial sovereignty of states. International law enforcement at sea is influenced by, or subject to, international conventions, codes and treaties that comprise the bulk of international law. Consequently, international law enforcement at sea can be a complex legal and practical activity in practice, and is distinctly different to municipal policing operations, because it requires a degree of cooperation between various international actors - most significantly, states - to avoid possibly serious security or relational consequences of security misunderstandings.[3]

Since law enforcement at sea can take place within or between territorial seas, or upon the high seas, it therefore requires that states have a physical and legal capacity to conduct operations.[4] In order to practice law enforcement at sea, states must possess a physical capacity to do so, usually in the form of maritime patrol vessels and aircraft but just as important is the clarification between states about territorial jurisdiction, rights of vessels at sea, and sovereignty of states in whose maritime territory suspect vessels may be pursued and boarded. It is therefore essential that states engaged in non-traditional maritime security have clear understandings in place in the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements, or be party to international conventions regarding its practice if they are to avoid misunderstandings that might lead to conflict.

The end of the Cold War and the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 were watershed events that have influenced the meaning of security, and the way that states approach non-traditional maritime security cooperation. One consequence is that the priorities of states regarding maritime security have evolved from emphasizing Cold War strategic deterrence and a bi-polar security paradigm, to emphasizing regions and non-traditional threats, such as the enforcement of the codes treaties and conventions that comprise the greater part of international law at sea.

1.2 Central Argument

This paper argues that, security cooperation at sea is possible if proposed agreements have an underlying coherent, formal and consensus-built legal framework supporting region-specific and regionally built mechanisms. From a perspective of security regime building, states will agree to principles, rules, and norms that control their behaviour when they are confident of respect for sovereignty, and that such cooperation aligns with their national security interests. A comparative analysis is made of cooperation among states in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia and an argument made that builds upon existing regime theory, incorporating elements of realist and liberalist ideas about the way that states cooperate. The purpose of this research is to examine changing security cooperative behaviour of states within two regions, by focussing on law enforcement at sea, a non-traditional facet of maritime security, and questioning the significance of confidence building in facilitating maritime security cooperation. The research asks, in this evolving security environment, what are the influencing factors leading states to maritime security cooperation and what are the influencing factors keeping them apart?

1.3 Methodology

Chapter Three (not included in this post but available on request - email the author at tim.martin@deakin.edu.au ) a method of comparative analysis of security cooperation among states in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia is used to investigate this paper's thesis. Despite the more obvious differences between the two regions, certain similarities were apparent in the immediate period following the end of the Cold War. Of particular interest has been the influence and involvement of the United States, and the reliance on international law to protect territorial sovereignty of states, when managing law enforcement at sea.

1.4 Background to the Research

Maritime Security Regimes

Security as a feature of the international system of states has a long tradition of power politics. Within and between states, as well as within the political structure of the system of states and within regions, the study of security has had a military-political foundation, associated with threats to and by states and other international actors. Therefore international security has been a study of the way that states have related on matters of conflict and war, and determinations of legitimate and non-legitimate use of force in the international system of states.[5] Joseph Camilleri argues that the state’s centrality in providing security - protecting the integrity of the state and its citizens - has declined with challenges to the capacity of states to defend increasingly porous borders.[6]

Regime theories that during the Cold War had equated security with military and state-centred views became more inclusive of non-traditional aspects.[7] At the same time, in the post-Cold War era, the structure of the international system remained dependant on the stability provided by a few major maritime powers.[8] By the end of the 1990s, two security perspectives prevailed; on the one hand, the security ‘wideners’, who argued that security could no longer be seen in isolation from broader world events, and on the other the ‘narrow’ security view that maintained a military and state-centric focus.[9] For the former, security was removed from the sole propriety of the state to other actors. Changing the referent object(s) of security in this way, notes David Mutimer, alters the ‘source and nature of threats … therefore the manner by which security can be achieved.’[10] Francisco Rojas-Aravena appears to support Barry Buzan’s widening of security concept, arguing that security is more inclusive than just military objectives, although interdependence and realist perspectives are not mutually exclusive.[11]

[t]he threats of the twenty-first century should take into consideration a number of aspects that go beyond strictly military variables and simultaneously incorporate economic, political, environmental and cultural issues. Phenomena associated with globalization, together with maintenance of national sovereignty, must be put into a synthetic context in which domestic and international phenomena are manifested simultaneously in widely varying aspects.[12]

Ideas about the utility of maritime security regimes have changed from bi-polar strategic mechanisms of the Cold War to a broader definition, encompassing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that regulate and coordinate law enforcement at sea. Although widely discussed in general terms, academic studies about the post-Cold War era regimes that regulate and coordinate law enforcement at sea, implicate certain actors, such as the United States and the United Nations, as having a great deal of influence over how such non-traditional maritime security cooperation occurs.[13] Predictions that significant non-traditional maritime security challenges lie ahead for smaller states often include the United States as the most significant international actor and security partner. For instance, the United States’ bilateral agreements with some Caribbean states have given it a ‘violence management’ role in ocean management and constabulary duties. The United States has sought to address narcotics smuggling, provide diplomacy, and establish an armed law enforcement presence at sea in the Caribbean and in Southeast Asia and Pacific regions. Determined in part by economic factors, these roles gained significance since Caribbean states claimed offshore maritime zones in accordance with developments in international law. A consequence of the expansion of maritime territories is that some Caribbean states have lacked a capacity to police their maritime zones. They have therefore faced the dilemma of accepting assistance offered by the United States while at the same time protecting their sovereignty from excessive interference that such assistance may entail.[14] The United States has in turn, referred to the international conventions created within the United Nations as these provide a legal framework for further international agreements.

Regional maritime security regime building provides a four-fold observation, according to Mark J. Valencia. First, the interplay between forces of integration and disintegration within a regional system; second, the growth or decline of an organisation; third, the establishment of links between one regional system and others within the same geographic location; and finally, the impact of organisations on the nature and use of the ocean space over which their activities extend.[15] In reference to counter piracy at sea operations, Michael Bahar advocates a security regime of ‘optimal deterrence’ that he considers a predetermined point between ‘maximum military pursuit and neglect’.[16] Whereas Bahar relies on states finding common ground for taking adequate responses, it nevertheless shares with Arthur A. Stein’s ‘common aversion’ the idea that each actor seeks acceptance of limitations of behaviour toward and co-jointly with, other members, and comes to agreement on a common course of action.[17] In common aversion regimes there is no agreement on the best outcome but all actors agree on which outcome to avoid. At the other extreme is isolation, whereby actors promote national interests by steering clear of entanglement with other states: a deliberate policy of restricting international interactions.[18]

Security Cooperation between States

In contemporary international relations, scholars have sought to study the behaviour of the international system by trying to understand security relations between states. Within the Caribbean and Southeast Asian systems, stability can be encouraged by a powerful state, such as the United States, having regional hegemony. Cooperation between actors is more likely given the presence of a powerful state.[19] If the true goal of cooperation for powerful states is regional hegemony, then presumably, by expanding its own influence, the United States seeks stability and other advantages over the other actors in the regional system. Stability favours trade but depends on the United States’ ability to project military power in support of its political objectives.[20] Michael Donelan argues that the rules and norms of international relations are just power politics translated into a different idiom, ‘a record of the methods and results of power politics’.[21] Jervis appears to support this position, questioning whether cooperation between states is possible; that lacking an overarching world authority to enforce international law, states weigh the benefits of cooperation against the risks of non-cooperation.[22] When states are reluctant to cooperate, it is possible that there are underlying self-interests that influence the strategic decision-making process.

Robert Jackson argues that political theory, international law and international theory are all part of the ‘one overall theory of the modern state’ and the system of states.[23] However, ‘international relations’ itself is terminology with inherently problematic connotations, inferring national rather than state relationships and often implying group action and participation by an interrelated world society, distinct from a ‘society of states’. Heterogeneous and integrated, this interrelated world society is also anarchic as it lacks an overarching central authority for the maintenance of law and order.[24] Opinion, leadership and the forces and interactions across national frontiers are constantly changing and stability of the international system is in a constant battle with change.[25] Past theories of relations between states included classical-realist discussions alluding to rivalry and enmity rather than cooperation, and examined the role of power in security relations between states.[26] Therefore, international theory has been a ‘theory of survival’ of the states themselves.[27]

As a maritime security peacekeeper, the United Nations has a significant role with regard to naval and law enforcement at sea cooperation.[28] According to A.E. Moodie, physical conditions and human activities on a global scale that finds expression in the foreign policies of other actors, influences the behaviour of international actors.[29] Maritime security ‘regimes’ are a system of rules that shape acceptable activities, according to the United States Coast Guard (USCG), linking ‘domain awareness’ and capabilities that comprise ‘ocean governance’. Therefore, ocean governance, regimes, domain awareness and capabilities are tools enabling marine authorities, such as the USCG, to respond to threats by managing current criminal and other activities at sea and assessing what is likely to happen in the future. This definition situates security regimes within a context of defence against civil threats to law and order.[30] Therefore, security regimes have meaning within particular contexts. Since the end of the Cold War, security has evolved to take on a wider meaning more inclusive of legal as well as practical cooperation.

The international characterization of ‘maritime security’ supports the inclusion of law enforcement at sea. ‘Maritime security’ is itself an imprecise term and like ‘law’ is conceptual rather than tangible. The United States Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)[31] gives a broad definition of maritime security as the protection of the home state from attacks from the sea, against hostile forces upon the oceans. ONI includes as security threats at sea, drug traffickers, pirates, and terrorists. The ONI narrows maritime security down to a national security context of protecting all of a nation’s interests upon the seas.[32]

The terminology of maritime security sometimes merges with marine safety, since law enforcement at sea also takes on this other role. ‘Safety’ is arguably an outcome of security rather than the other way around, whilst ‘maritime’ refers to human activity on the world’s oceans, including navigation, naval affairs, shipping and commerce by sea. On the other hand, maritime ‘security’ can imply safety of sailors, defence of waterways and coastlines and provision of safe ports and harbours.[33] Safety is arguably an outcome of security rather than the other way around. The Lexington Institute reduces maritime security to simply being a ‘fancy way to describe safety at sea’, linking shipping companies, fishing fleets and navies with economic prosperity - all linked but not specifically defined as security issues.[34] On the other hand, Joseph L. Nimmich refers to the military-like nature of enforcing international law at sea, to the ‘sheer magnitude of the area of operations, the number of major assets employed, the necessity of effective command, control communication and intelligence, and operational planning all mirror military operational challenges and techniques’.[35] Although marine police and coast guards generally do not fulfil a strategic role, the presence of naval forces sends an unequivocal message of power. Law enforcement at sea is one aspect of security relations states have been more willing to cooperate with other marine authorities. Narcotics smuggling and piracy at sea are crimes associated with violence and terror; therefore, although they differ from acts of conflict or war between states that rely on military intervention, an armed policing authority is still necessary. Pirates and narcotics smugglers seek financial gain, rather than political goals, so that a law enforcement response by marine authorities can be more appropriate than conventional naval operations. Nevertheless, enforcing international or domestic law is an element of maritime security recognized by policing and naval authorities.[36]

Although the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) gives a definition of ‘maritime safety’, it does not define ‘maritime security’ at all, despite referring to both as integral IMO responsibilities.[37] A specialised agency of the United Nations, the IMO has a widely recognised, central role in security and safety at sea, working alongside many states, in particular the United States, developing international ‘treaties, guidelines and recommendations’ to prevent unlawful acts at sea. The IMO is therefore an international actor that is relevant to any discussion on cooperation at sea. With the support of almost all of the world’s 168 states with direct maritime interests, the IMO makes reference to piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea, the transport of weapons of mass destruction and narcotics smuggling, and cooperation at sea between states.[38] Although the IMO refers to United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) when negotiating legal conventions and treaties, the IMO is only mentioned once (Article 2 of Annex VIII) within UNCLOS.[39] Nevertheless, The IMO functions as a medium between the interests of states while UNCLOS[40] provides a legal framework for cooperation between states.[41]

Maritime security has evolved as the international political environment has shifted from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. Consequently, the concept, definition and terminology of maritime security have also changed. During the Cold War, ‘maritime security’ referred to naval strategy and military doctrine to meet the priorities of bi-polar strategic interests. In the post-Cold War era, maritime security has been refined to include law enforcement at sea. For example, Cold War ‘interdiction’ meant action taken to deny enemy control of a given ocean region, or from taking a particular naval action, whereby naval forces denied access or transit of naval vessels through specified maritime regions during times of conflict.[42] In the post-Cold War era, interdiction refers to the interception of ships and vessels engaged in illegal activities, such as crime, by armed marine authorities.[43]

Another important concept for maritime security is territorial sovereignty. This signifies that states have the fullest rights known to international law, over their own territories.[44] This includes the ability to make laws and police them within maritime territories, as well as the capacity to make independent decisions about when and with whom they will cooperate. This is significant because, when naval forces and other marine authorities respond to non-traditional maritime security threats that involve violence, such as narcotics smuggling or piracy against ships at sea, an armed response is required to meet it. This complicates policing at sea because armed vessels represent individual state authority, therefore challenging the authority of other states with which it interacts. Unless there is a mechanism of understanding between actors that makes provision for respecting municipal laws, international maritime law, and the territorial sovereignty of states, misinterpretation can lead to conflict. However, states are less concerned about the integrity of their territorial sovereignty if they are negotiating with other states on non-traditional maritime security issues, such as law enforcement at sea. Criminals respect neither law nor sovereignty but states have a basic national interest to provide protection to mariners and vessels that transit their maritime territories, including preventing crime at sea and the violence with which it is associated.[45]

1.5 Structure and Outline of the Thesis

This paper consists of seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the paper's thesis by outlining the research problem, central argument, and background to the research. This includes the structure of the thesis, .

Chapter Two contains the literature review and frames the thesis theoretically. It includes discussion of relevant literature on perspectives about security cooperation between states and security regimes. Maritime security regimes were discussed during the Cold War as a means to prevent escalation of global nuclear conflict. In the post-Cold War era, maritime security regimes have been discussed as an outcome of increasing behaviour of states relying on legal mechanisms. These mechanisms ensure that interaction on security matters address non-traditional maritime security threats, but maintain the integrity of territorial sovereignty, and contribute to overall capacity building – in short, that they are good for the state. Regime theory incorporates elements of realist and liberalist ideas about the way the way that states cooperate. Theories about security regimes and regionalism contend that states will agree to principles, rules and norms that control their behaviour when they are confident that other states will do the same.[46] Differing perspectives, normative values, and practical capabilities (capacity) have all influenced the degree to which states are confident that security cooperation is in their best interests. David J. Bederman refers to a ‘schizophrenic battle’ that has been raging between those who believe that security cooperation between states is possible and those who see this ideal as unattainable and not desirable anyway.[47] Realist theories that position states as the most significant actors in the international system see states coordinating their activities only when it is in their own interests to do so. States within the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, for instance, have been willing to cooperate on low-security maritime threats but have been less willing to participate in multilateral security mechanisms, retaining the right to choose how and with whom they collaborate. Liberalism proponents, on the other hand, argue that a function of the state is to provide appropriate regulatory frameworks and institutions that facilitate cooperation.[48] Therefore, in this broad portrait, both perspectives see cooperation as possible, with realists focussing on power and self-interest but liberals focussing on community. At the heart of this dichotomy are questions about what constitutes power and to what extent it is conditioned by international law.

Chapter Three [not included in this post but available on request  tim.martin@deakin.edu.au] discusses the comparative analysis methodology used in this thesis. The scope and key assumptions section lays out the specific and non-specific questions that this research seeks to answer through interpretation of data and application of theory. This research questions the significance of confidence building in facilitating maritime security cooperation. Threat and response are two sides of the same coin. Weighing up the costs of cooperation against the costs of no cooperation, the research is asking, what are the forces leading states to cooperate and what are the forces keeping them apart in this changed security environment?

Chapter Four examines the Caribbean Sea case study. It situates the development of agreements, conventions and treaties specific to the Caribbean region, and the role of the United States as an initiator of these and significantly, provides the first case study for the comparative methodology used in this thesis. Enforcing law at sea in the Caribbean has focussed on the activities of narcotics traffickers and the violence that this behaviour creates within Caribbean states. A response to narcotics trafficking by sea has been the development of bilateral security agreements between the United States and individual states; each agreement similarly seeking to facilitate maritime law enforcement cooperation but also shaped to meet the specific concerns of individual states. Maritime security cooperation has been possible because the bilateral agreements are a result of consensus on the terms of cooperation and reaffirmation of the territorial sovereignty of individual states. The United States has led a confidence building initiative that has encouraged Caribbean states to engage in cooperation.

Chapter Five examines Southeast Asia and is the second case study in the comparative analysis made in this thesis. Maritime law enforcement cooperation of states in Southeast Asia diverge from the way that Caribbean agreements have occurred, despite, and to some extent because of the influence that the United States has had within the region. Enforcing law at sea in the Caribbean has progressed in different ways, yet is comparable to Southeast Asia in certain aspects. Southeast Asian states have sought to cooperate between each other and limit cooperation. Consequently, the United States was excluded from direct participation in coordinated maritime patrols, despite the capacity it has offered to the region. In Southeast Asia, the United States has inadvertently encouraged cooperation although other factors have contributed to confidence building between states in the region, including interdependence.

Chapter Six discusses rule of law and respect for territorial sovereignty of states as the foundation for cooperation mechanisms used in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. It also discusses how the law of the sea is a foundational legal regime upon which security cooperation at sea is based, and situates the United States and United Nations roles within the maritime security environment as the most significant actor and institution respectively, of building regimes of law enforcement at sea in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. This chapter draws conclusions from analysis of the data provided by chapters four and five. The influence of the United States is significant as it lends legitimacy and de facto facilitation of security cooperation, providing legality to regional partnerships in the Caribbean, and influencing Southeast Asian actors. On the other hand, the United Nations and its specialised maritime agency, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) have provided a function as providers of codes, conventions and treaties that make up the bulk of international maritime law. This has underpinned the framework of security cooperation between states at sea in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia. It has promoted confidence-building mechanisms as important measures that lay the groundwork for security cooperation at sea.

Chapter Seven is significant part of the comparative methodology as it draws on the previous chapter’s analysis and revisits the literature, thereby concluding the thesis. This chapter discusses how the findings inform current dialogue on changing meaning of security, cooperation between states, and the potential for regime formation. The chapter concludes by noting gaps in the research, and asking ‘how do the findings influence the direction of future research?

Conclusion

In the following chapter, literature surrounding security cooperation between states from the perspective of regimes is discussed as a prelude to understanding the theoretical perspective of the thesis.


[1] The ‘post-Cold War era’ depicts a distinct but unfinished period in time. The end of the Cold War era began in 1985 and concluded when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, marking the beginning of the post-Cold War era.
[2] Michael Pugh (ed.) Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: a Framework for United Nations Operations, Manchester University Press, UK, 1994, pp.74-75.
[3] Patricia Jimenez Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Oxford University Press, vol.13, no.1, 2008, pp. 49-91.
[4] ‘High seas’ refers to international waters, not claimed by any state, that are situated outside state maritime borders; territorial sea refers to that body of water extending to seaward from the territory of a state, usually three or 12 nautical miles, and that forms an extension of the territory of the state. The ‘territorial sea’ is an extension of the territory of a coastal state, and extends to 12 nautical miles perpendicular to the coastline, measured from the low-tide mark of the coastline––One international nautical mile =1.852 kilometres exactly (that = 1.150779 land miles) source: OED 1995, p.1741.
[5] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, ch. 2, 1997.
[6] Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited: Implications for the Asia-Pacific’, in William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun, (eds), Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, United Nations University Press, 2000, pp. 305-307.
[7] Some authors who have discussed maritime security regimes from a post-Cold War perspective include, but are not limited to: Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, (eds), ‘The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region’, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 118, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1996; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia’, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 31 iss.3 July, 2000; David N. Griffiths, Fred W. Crickard, and Edward L. Tummers, Regional Maritime Security: Four Case Studies: Americas, Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Indian Ocean, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 2002; Eric Brahm, ‘International Regimes’, Beyond Intractability, (eds), Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, September, 2005; John F. Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, Naval War College Review, vol. 58, no. 3, Summer, 2005; Michael Bahar, ‘Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 40, no. 1, 2007, pp.1-86.
[8] Barry Buzan, and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[9] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 3.
[10] Mutimer. David, ‘Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies’, in Craig Snyder (ed.) Contemporary Security and Strategy, Macmillan, London, 1999, pp. 82-6.
[11] Francisco Rojas-Aravena, ‘The New Security Agenda in the Caribbean: the Challenge of Cooperation’, in The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, Ralph H. Espach and Joseph S. Tulchin, (eds), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 2000, p. 65.
[12] Francisco Rojas-Aravena, ‘The New Security Agenda’.
[13] John Michael Lewis Geragotelis, Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Countering Maritime Terrorism in the United States, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2006.
[14] Griffiths, Crickard, and Tummers, Regional Maritime Security, 2002.
[15] Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime Regime Building’, 2000, pp. 223-247.
[16] Bahar, ‘Optimal Deterrence’.
[17] Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, International Organization, no. 36, Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324.
[18] Deon Geldenhuys, ‘Isolated States: a Comparative Analysis’, Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 15, Cambridge, UK, 1990, pp. 6-9.
[19] John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Better to be Godzilla than Bambi’, Foreign Policy, no. 146, January-February, 2005, p. 47.
[20] Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: the Key Concepts, Routledge, 2002, pp. 135-37.
[21] Donelan M., Elements of International Political Theory, Oxford, 1990, p. 3, in Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: a Reflective Approach’, Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, (eds), Regime Theory and International Relations, Clarendon Press, 1995.
[22] Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,’ World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, 1978, pp. 167-214; Nicholas J. Wheeler and K. Booth, ‘The Security Dilemma’, in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger, (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 30.
[23] Robert Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: from Anarchy to Cosmopolis, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p. 39.
[24] Trygve Mathisen, Methodology in The Study of International Relations, Greenwood Press, 1974, p. 3.
[25] Mathisen, Methodology, 1974, p. 189; Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 1990, p. 4.
[26] Classical realists include, but are not limited to; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (translation by) Rex Warner, Penguin Books, London, 1972; Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, 1513, in Antony Jay, Management and Machiavelli: an enquiry into the politics of corporate life, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, NY, 1967, pp. 22-7; Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan, Michael Oakeshott, (ed.), Oxford, 1946, p. 103, in Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1970, p. 33.; Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Elements of Power’, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition, revised Alfred. A. Knopf, New York, ch. 9, 1978.
[27] Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, International Relations, vol. 2 no. 1, 1960, pp. 35-48.
[28] Pugh, Maritime Security and Peacekeeping,1994.
[29] A.E. Moodie, Geography Behind Politics, London, 1947, pp. 59-60, in TrygveMathisen, Methodology in the Study of International Relations, Greenwood Press, 1974.
[30] US Coast Guard, The US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, Washington DC, 2007.
[31] ONI forms part of the United States Navy, and provides both unclassified and classified analysis of Naval and other maritime security and safety events globally, including weekly updates on piracy at sea and advice to mariners in areas prone to piracy.
[32] Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020, US Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Washington DC, ch. 2, 1 March 1999.
[33] ‘Maritime’ in this thesis uses the Oxford Dictionary (1995) definition, referring to human activities connected to the sea including seafaring upon the sea for defence, commercial reasons or illegal purposes. According to J.N. Mak, states and coastal states differ, as they have different interests, perspectives and priorities.–––‘Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working together and Alone in the Strait of Malacca s’, in Ong-Webb and Graham Gerard, Piracy,Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Strait of Malacca, ISEAS, Singapore, 2006, pp. 134-159.
[34] Rebecca Christie, Maritime Security, Lexington Institute, Arlington, Virginia, United States, January 2008, p. 2.
[35] Joseph L. Nimmich, ‘The Application of Conventional Military Deterrence Theory to Maritime Law Enforcement Interdiction’, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997, pp. 1-2.
[36] INTERPOL Media Release, ‘Law enforcement is ‘missing link’ in fight against maritime piracy, INTERPOL chief tells G8 meeting’, 29 May, 2009.
[37] International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Maritime Security, 2011.
[38] International Maritime Organization (IMO), Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea ; IMO, ‘What is the ISPS Code?’, July 2004; Australian Government, ‘International Ship and Port Facility Security Code’, Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 13 October 2010; IMO, ‘Work Undertaken by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in an Effort to Prevent and Combat Terrorism’, Fifth Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with International, Regional and Subregional Organizations, 29-31 October 2007, Nairobi, Kenya; Todd Kenyon, Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide: International Conventions, ‘Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’, Rome, 10 March 1988.
[39] UNCLOS, ‘Lists of Experts’, Article 1, Annex VIII. Special Arbitration.
[40] UNCLOS will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three.
[41] Michele Ameri and Michael Shewchuk, Maritime Security and Safety, UNITAR/DOALOS Briefing, 17 October 2007.
[42] Devon Chaffee, Freedom or Force on the High Seas? Arms Interdiction and International Law, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (draft), 15 August 2003; Commander Joseph L. Nimmich (USCG), ‘The Application of Conventional Military Deterrence Theory to Maritime Law Enforcement Interdiction’, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, 1997, pp. 1-2.
[43] United States Code, ‘Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act’, [Jones Act] US Title 46A-Shipping (appendix), ch. 38, 1986.
[44] Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edition, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2003, pp. 411-413.
[45] J. Ashley Roach; ‘Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 59, iss. 1, Fall-Winter, 2005, p. 97-116.
[46] Authors who have discussed security regimes include but are not limited to: Ernst B. Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 207-243; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 185-205; Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 325-355; Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324; Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 357-378; Oran R. Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes’, International Organization , vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 277-297; Donald J. Puchala, and Raymond F. Hopkins’, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 245-275 ;William R. Thompson, ‘The Regional Subsystem: a Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1973, pp. 89-117; Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime Regime Building’, 2000, pp. 223-247.; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Eric Brahm, ‘International Regimes’, Beyond Intractability, (eds), Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2005.
[47] David J.Bederman, ‘Constructivism, Positivism and Empiricism in International Law’, Georgetown Law Journal, January 2001, (Review of) Anthony C. Arend, ‘Legal Rules and International Society’, 1999.
[48] Alexander Moseley, ‘Political Philosophy’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Martin, 2006.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

By Timothy A. Martin (copyright 2011) 

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses cooperation from the perspective of security regimes. A wide range of complex ideas pertains to cooperation theories and security relations between states. Regime theories have not sat neatly within either realist[1] or liberalist[2] theoretical camps. The anomalous position of security regimes is partly due to its origins in Cold War strategic analysis, when new forms of cooperation to limit nuclear arms stockpiling necessitated alternate analytical pathways to prevailing realist theory. Even a non-traditional maritime security regime, that focuses on enforcement of law at sea has secondary elements of cooperation between states that have been described in terms of ‘security communities’ and ‘security alliances’, and an adaptation of economic regime formation through regionalism that attempt to explain why states do, or do not cooperate, on the issue of security at sea.

2.2 Cooperation and Security Regimes

Cold War Security Regimes

Discussion of security regimes originated in academic debates and criticisms about high security of strategic military issues during the final decades of the Cold War, rather than the low security of law enforcement at sea.[3] Discussions centred on cooperation between states on specific strategic security issues, such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I, 1972 and SALT II, 1979), that sought to manage nuclear ballistic missiles stockpiles and cooperate to reduce their proliferation. Despite criticisms that Cold War theories about international regimes have ambiguous terminologies and concepts, regime theory attempts to answer why states seek security cooperation despite the potential threat this poses to territorial sovereignty.[4] Study of security regimes sought to determine the nature of Cold War relations within a bi-polarised political-military system of states, investigating the potential for cooperation despite a high degree of insecurity.[5] Security regime theorists used conceptual games, such as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, to gauge the probability of irrational decision-making by nuclear-armed actors despite the availability of other options, such as self-interest.[6] This conceptualisation posed problems of competition between potentially belligerent states, and trialled alternative possibilities of win-win or lose-lose, or win-lose outcomes, when actors adopted irrationality in their decision-making process.[7] In the post-Cold War era, in the absence of bi-polar power structures, analysis seeks to understand why states make decisions about security cooperation, when security is not an area of international relations towards which states are naturally inclined to cooperate on.

Since the end of the Second World War, the historical path of cooperation leads through international institutions and organisations, predominantly the United Nations. States made rational decisions that incorporated their independence and respect for their sovereignty. Although rationalists recognise anarchy as the defining characteristic of the international system, they also believe in international society, order and procedural structure. Traditions and institutions for the rationalist are important procedural frameworks; these have provided diplomacy, balance of power, international law and occasionally war.[8] Whereas liberal institutionalists reason that states seek absolute, win-win gains, realists argue that states seek relative, zero-sum gains. Regimes contain norms of behaviour and expectations, and actors weigh costs and benefits against objectives, such as improving security. Regimes arise, Stephen Krasner argues, because actors relinquish independent decision-making because out of self-interest, they seek to contend with the dilemmas of ‘common interests’ and ‘common aversions’.[9] Although none of the states within the Caribbean or Southeast Asian case studies has been at war with one another during the two decades covered by this thesis, tensions exist as they do in almost all regions where states interact; between those actors who have sought security cooperation and those that have not.

Divided into two main types, regimes characteristically are common interest or common aversion; each allows states to coordinate.[10] Common interest refers to states acting to ensure a certain outcome, collaborating in order to coordinate their efforts. In common aversion regimes, on the other hand, states refrain from certain behaviour in order to act jointly and positively for the purpose of the agreement, vesting institutions with monitoring and mediating powers in the event of conflict occurring. Common aversion regimes seek to avoid a certain outcome, even if they each have different overall strategic goals. In common aversion regimes, the outcome that actors can agree they do not want, can lead unlikely collaborators to form regimes.[11] An example of common aversion was the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States seeking to manage peacefully their competition during the Cold War. An example is the United Nations’ practice of ‘collective security’ and ‘common aversion’.[12] Collective security proposes that by states agreeing to come to each other’s aid in times of war, peace is assured. In the international system, where states are self-interested actors seeking to balance power, collective security allows states to place collective interests above national interests. For realists, however, this is a theory of how the world ought to be rather than the way the world actually is. Realists traditionally see conflict and power as natural conditions of the international system. Yet, the evolving nature of security has meant that ‘cooperative security’ acknowledges an increasing interdependence of states in areas such as economics and security.[13]

One of the similarities of different systems of states is that trade interdependence can provide regional actors with a certain level of confidence when discussions turn to security issues. Forums such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) do facilitate discussion on regional security matters.[14] Interdependence perspectives focus on the significance of states forming trade ties through such organisations that then pave the way for other relationships, such as security. A decline of military force and power balancing with the end of the Cold War, and a rise in economic and other forms of complex transnational connections between states has increased the likelihood of cooperation amongst regions of states; economic interdependence makes conflict too costly.[15] It merges realist and liberal perspectives, where relative gains of trade potentially lead to absolute gains in security. Interdependence theorists suggest a concept of ‘regimes’ which have cooperative structures that set rules and standards to govern specific sets of activities.[16] Regimes result when states form multilateral agreements in order to regulate their actions in support of a specific issue.[17] As intra-regional trade has grown, conflict becomes too costly, and resolution of low-security maritime threats is established through cooperation with trading partners. This neo-liberal vision of economic and other interaction provides avenues for peace that suggest the long-term stability that a security regime brings, but the fluidity of security alliances do not.

As states in one region engage in maritime law enforcement agreements with other major states, there may be more incentive for other regional actors to participate in similar arrangements, because the cost of participation may not appear to outweigh the expected benefits. States that take tentative steps to coordinate security at sea in seeking acceptable norms of behaviour from other participating states, point to a likelihood that risks to sovereignty are understood to be merely implied; perhaps by other actors who may be risk-averse. Oran Young argues a behavioural-legal connection that regimes encompass social institutions that govern the actions of states within specific issue areas in order to become ‘recognised patterns of behaviour or practise around which [actor] expectations converge’.[18] Stephen Krasner argues that regimes focus the behaviour of states around converging interests.[19] Robert Jervis seems to agree with Young and Krasner’s perspective that regimes influence and restrain the behaviour of participating states.[20]

For Jervis also, international law and behaviour intertwine. States participate in a collaborative endeavour where international regimes consist of ‘principles, rules and norms’ permitting them to ‘be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate’.[21] Arthur Stein appears to support Jervis and Krasner’s position, reasoning that regimes are an authority over or between states, defining national behaviour and shaping the way they interact.[22] Young appears to agree, arguing that, a regime exists when a collection of states come to agree on how the behaviour of participating actors is to be regulated in a specific area of interest.[23] Regimes offer the anarchical system of states (Christian Wolf’s natural, savage, ‘individuals’[24]) a sense of order out of a common need, according to Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan.[25] On the other hand, while Anthony Arend concurs with Young, he cautions that while states seek to regulate international issues by a common means this does not necessarily indicate that states have common interests.[26]

2.3 Situating Regimes within Theory

Stephen Walt argues the idea that realist theories were in some way redundant in the post-Cold War era is false, given the number of conflicts globally and suggests that realist theories about cooperation between states retain some relevance. For Walt, the study of contemporary international relations has been a drawn out contest between realist, liberal, and radical traditions but security regimes form a bridge between the first two.[27] Realists and liberalists perceive the causes of cooperation differently but security regimes are not exclusively situated within the liberal or realist camp. As a form of cooperation behaviour, regimes bear the hallmarks of both perspectives. Other perspectives, such as complex-interdependence, highlight the value of regimes in promoting the common economic interests of states that might in turn lead to confidence building, and security cooperation. Knowledge-based theories, such as constructivism and feminism primarily focus on the way that ideas and norms shape perceptions of international problems, highlighting the role of regimes in this process.[28]

From a realist perspective, states may see cooperation as a way to limit the power of neighbouring states, situating power as a central feature of states who seek to coordinate security. Whilst liberals seek to prevent conflict, realists see conflict between states as the norm.[29] It is also an argument about the potential for states to ‘pursue benign or bad ends through illegitimate or admirable means.’[30] Kenneth Waltz argues that states are egotistical actors who prioritise their own needs and interests.[31] Whilst Waltz’s structural realist perspective lacks Thomas Hobbes’ overarching sovereign authority,[32] it bears characteristic ‘fingerprints’ of both Thucydides[33] and late 19th century ‘Social Darwinism’[34] that proposed the strong inevitably surviving at the expense of the weak.

Realist and liberalist perspectives are comprised of a useful range of sub-theories about the way that states engage in security cooperation, and form a fundamental dichotomy of academic debate about the way that states relate, cooperate and change. However, while realists tend to focus on self-interest and power of the state; and liberals tend to focus on institutionalism and cooperation between states; regimes are situated somewhere in the middle of both camps. When discussing international society and conceptualising regimes, we are questioning the relationship between law and norms on the one hand, and power and interests on the other.[35] Robert Keohane places regimes in a managerial and ethical role, rather than the realist role where regimes are dependent on the presence of a strong state having hegemony for success. From the standpoint of realist theories about an anarchic international system, regimes are an anomaly, diverging from the idea that states are primarily self-interested.[36] Keohane reasons that liberalists envision economic interaction providing avenues for peace, rather than the fluidity of alliances that realists prefer, offering a more enduring path to cooperation between states. This includes interdependence, cooperative structures, and set rules and standards that govern specific sets of activities.[37] Therefore, regimes are guiding legal frameworks within which states agree to act, and Jervis describes them as the ‘principles, procedures, norms, or rules that govern particular issue areas ... global governance in an anarchical realm’.[38] Conversely, Hurrell reasons that rules and norms of international life purely reflect the power and interests of states.[39]Gregory Bruce Smith advocates a somewhat more Hobbesian view that human nature is at the heart of international relations and remains essentially unchanged, but he advocates that international politics remains flexible and adaptable to change.[40]

Since the end of the Cold War, theorists have sought to understand, and in some cases, to predict how states would behave; this had consequences for international relations and strategic planning, since the imperatives of bi-polarised power between the Soviet Union and United States had dissolved, leaving states to ponder on the question of security relations between states. In 1989, at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, Francis Fukuyama explored the possibility that ‘history’ had in a sense, come to an end and that realist ideas might be replaced by other perspectives, such as liberalism, as the dominant theoretical concepts for understanding relations between states. Fukuyama was debating the end of a conflict era and the possibility of increasing global cooperation. Drawing inspiration from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, Fukuyama reasoned that since international society had rejected other forms of political governance, such as monarchy, dictatorship and finally communism, ‘history’ may have in a sense ended and a final societal era begun, consisting of liberal idealism and market-oriented capitalism. Fukuyama hypothesised that in this new epoch, economic calculation, technical problem solving, environmental issues and consumer demand might create an era devoid of the dynamics of the past.[41]

Whereas realists have focussed on power, liberalists viewed collaboration succeeding if states were willing to lend legitimacy to initiatives that involve cooperation.[42] Liberalists seek a form of governance that offers individuals a chance to pursue their lives in the ‘neutral framework’ of international law through agreements and treaties, even though the concept of an ideal neutral framework has led realists to condemn liberalist perspectives.[43] In contrast to realists, liberalists see cooperation and collaboration between states to be ‘norms’ of behaviour. State behaviour is the origin of norms but ‘norms’ also influence and shape the behaviour of states. Norms are the behaviour of states that arise through negotiation, political interaction and self-promotion and meet the expectations of all actors involved.[44] Liberalists see a complex interdependence occurring between states, through trade and financial exchanges.[45] Whereas realist’s argue that states are not naturally inclined toward cooperation,[46] integration theorists, institutionalists and security cooperation theorists take the opposing view that weaker states fear the flexing of power of more powerful states and the threat this poses to sovereignty.[47] Consequently, weaker states and states that are more powerful have historically utilised institutions or legal frameworks for different reasons. Weaker states seek to minimise threats to sovereignty. States that are more powerful seek to apply power while avoiding both sanctions and war.[48]

2.4 Linking ‘Insecurity’ and ‘Region’

Insecurity

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 suggested that Samuel Huntington’s premise that Eastern and Western cultures would engage in a new era of insecurity was at least reasonable.[49] However, while Fukuyama had questioned realist positions in the changing context of the post-Cold War era and welcomed a new era of liberal cooperation between nations, John Mearsheimer maintained that states instinctively distrust one another. Mearsheimer saw the end of the Cold War as a part of the cycle of peace and conflict. From this alternative perspective of change, globalisation was merely an interval before states once again go head to head when power imbalances initiated conflict once more.[50] Fukuyama and Huntington were essentially saying similar things about global security. International security was undergoing change, and therefore changing relations between states. This change could be put down to two major events, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the war on terror in late 2001. Mearsheimer saw change as cyclic, and dips in the level of global conflict were the norms of international relations historically. Each of the authors argued that international security was undergoing changes precipitated by major security events.

For states to cooperate on security, where a high degree of trust is crucial, concerns about the integrity of territorial sovereignty permeate all security agreements including non-traditional maritime security. Sovereignty remains a fundamental basis for the existence of nation states. The principles ensconced within the conventions, codes and treaties that comprise the bulk of international law, and the ideals that premise the function of the United Nations, all indicate hallmarks of Kantian idealism; that policymakers and lawmakers must hear differences between states and make appropriate decisions that are founded on accepted, international law.[51] Immanuel Kant argued that the sovereignty of states is absolute, and upholding this right is a means to avoiding conflict but that governments must make morally guided decisions when constructing ‘universal law’.[52] Hobbes argued pragmatically that the application of reason balanced natural aggression; that an authority guides the way that societies act and promotes common strength and unity.[53] This proposes the incorporation of morality and reason into decision-making processes, an epistemological reasoning that instead of using analysis or experience to mould our concepts to the character of objects, the structure of our concepts should shape how we perceive objects. In this perspective, new knowledge and experience shape the world rather than simply describing it.[54] A counter-argument is that human behaviour is an irrational element in otherwise rational processes.[55] Rationality acts as a gradual elimination process, removing status, passions and prejudices from government decision-making, aiming for ‘systematic calculation and evidence-based reflection’.[56] Nevertheless, human behaviour transforms the world, so that interaction relies on our changing understandings of real world events.[57]

Significance of ‘Region’ in Regime Building

During the Cold War the great powers intervened in regions at the expense of opposing powers and weak regional states, so that authority was imposed. The realities of structure and politics of regional organisation during the Cold War meant that managing regional security could only have limited success.[58] According to Joseph Nye, during the bi-polarised security parameters of the Cold War, only two types of regional organisation were of consequence. First, a group of states with a continental or hemispheric basis, a set of decision-making institutions where the procedures for conflict resolution had been established; and second, collective defence establishments with a geographic basis ‘conforming to strategic needs rather than natural boundaries’, and whose countries were underdeveloped (for example, NATO, SEATO[59] and the Warsaw Pact).[60] William Thompson has defined a regional system, or ‘sub-system’ as a geographic collection of states whose proximity to one another indicates that incidents affecting one state probably affect neighbouring states as well. Thompson considered that most theories pertaining to regional systems concentrated on those interrelationships where all actors display a particular degree of constancy and intensity, and whereby the actions of one actor affects all other actors in that system. For Thompson, the foreign policies of great powers during the Cold War had given the impression that regional sub-systems did not exist or not taken seriously.[61] However, in the post-Cold War era, more significance is placed on recognition by the international community, as well as by the regional actors themselves of the extent of a given geographic regional structure.

In the 1990s a sense that regions were becoming important in some way, emerged through efforts to understand the behaviour of international actors in those areas where the flow of international trade was strategically significant to the global economic paradigm.[62] Immanuel Kant argued that spatial representation of objects is an important means of understanding them. For Kant, it is important to delineate the region of space that an object occupies. Failing this spatial depiction, sensations of the observer remain undifferentiated, making it difficult to ascribe specific properties to particular objects, such as a geographic area. According to Kant, observing an object that persistently occupies an area over a period consolidates a spatial awareness.[63] In other words, a region needs boundaries and positioning on a map or chart, and observation over time. Peter Katzenstein appears to adopt Kantian reasoning by disputing that a region is simply a given territorial entity constituted by certain physical facts, but instead ‘the creation of political power and purpose’.[64] Joseph Camilleri places importance on distinguishing between endogenous influences––those from inside a region, such as geography and demography, or history and political culture, and exogenous influences––those from outside a region, which may include the policies of states, transnational corporations, financial markets, international governmental institutions or non-governmental organisations. However, Camilleri considers that when it comes to security, member states of a region probably focus on the strategic interests of external states. Camilleri argues the key variables for the occurrence of regionalization, are the way that power is configured within and between an area; the axes of conflict internal or external to an area; the degree of cohesion and homogeneity in intra-regional relationships; and whether a region is relatively open or closed to external states.[65] A growing expansion of regional relations has meant that regions increasingly became significant places of conflict and cooperation.[66] Regionalism previously focussed on the way that states within a particular region developed cooperative, economic-based interrelationships, where mutual development could overcome politics and conflict.[67] For Björn Hettne, a regional approach to security infers that regional cooperation reduces the potential for conflict; the dividend of peace is that it facilitates development cooperation. A win-win outcome results from regional collaboration; that is, increased levels of regional action by governments wanting cooperation, and accepting a measure of externally imposed regimes, economic policies and security arrangements.[68] Regionalism emerged in the post-Cold War era through efforts to understand the behaviour of actors in regions where international trade has strategic significance. Jervis points out that, security-oriented regimes are more difficult to establish than economic regimes due to, ‘inherently competitive cast of many security concerns, the unforgiving nature of the problems, and the difficulty in determining how much security the state has or needs’.[69] However, regionalism can emphasise a ‘top to bottom’ approach to cooperation, where states are the main actors making decisions about security cooperation, and regional integration involves states within a specified region reaching a political consensus.[70] In the post-Cold War era, regionalism links to globalization and associates state and non-state actors as significant participants through trade but can lead to other forms of interaction on issues such as security. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are both regional organisations that have a primary focus on trade but with core commitments to respecting the sovereignty of fellow member states and both have been forums for discussing security.

Whereas regionalism had emphasised a ‘top to bottom’ approach, where states were the main actors ascertaining what regional cooperation mechanisms would be, neo-realism’s regional integration involves states within a specified region reaching a political consensus.[71] New-regionalism positions non-state actors as significant participants in regionalization processes. For Hettne, regionalism is a qualitatively new phenomenon, emerging with globalization; both ‘the two processes of globalization and regionalization … are articulated within the same larger process of global structural change’.[72] Hettne considers three ways to regional collaboration; first, increased levels of ‘regionness’ by governments wanting cooperation; second, accepting a measure of externally imposed regimes, economic policies and security arrangements; or third, a passive integration route. Hettne focuses on a regional approach of prevention, regarding policing, so that ‘regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation’.[73]

Adopting a Kantian reasoning, Peter Katzenstein argues that a region is not simply a given territorial entity constituted by certain physical facts, but is a creation of ‘political power and purpose’.[74] Regionalism is related to what Hettne, and Fredrik Söderbaumterm the ‘structural transformation of the world’, indicated by four significant events.[75] First, the change from bi-polarity towards multi-polarity, that affects the way that power and labour is distributed. Second, that the attitude of the United States is changing as its hegemony declines so that regionalism is regarded as less of a threat to its ability to project power. Third, that the ‘Westphalian’ nation-state system is wearing away while global interdependence between states (globalisation) is increasingly widespread, a point supported by Krasner. Their fourth point relates to globalising forces.[76] Camilleri places importance on distinguishing between endogenous influences - those from inside a region, such as geography and demography, or history and political culture, and exogenous influences - those from outside a region that may include the policies of states, transnational corporations, financial markets, international governmental institutions or non-governmental organisations.

Key international actors and institutions have played key roles in shaping the way that states have negotiated on trade but more significantly, how they have negotiated on security. In particular, the United Nations and the United States are most significant in the context of these regions. Camilleri argues that when it comes to security, member states of a region focus on the strategic interests of external states but organisations within the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, such as CARICOM and ASEAN, create a means by which states can negotiate intra-regionally. Camilleri argues the key variables for regionalisation are four-fold. They are the way that power is configured within and between an area; the axis of conflict internal or external to an area; the degree of cohesion and homogeneity in intra-regional relationships; and whether a region is relatively open or closed to the input of external states.[77] Jana Dorband claims that the role of a global hegemonic power in regional geopolitical order is a crucial analytical variable.[78] Therefore, any discussion about international law and sovereignty must include the United States since it has shaped both the interests and capacities of regional states and promoted respect for the rule of law. As the United States fundamental abiding principles imply no compromise of morality and law, it therefore encompasses a respect for sovereignty. A respect for sovereignty is a fundamental tenet of international conventions, codes and treaties created within the United Nations. Therefore, discussions about security cooperation between states, international law and sovereignty must include the institution of the United Nations.



[1] Authors taking a realist approach to cooperation between states include, but are not limited to: Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, The State, and War, NY, Columbia University Press, 1959; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer, 2000, pp. 5-41; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Better to Be Godzilla Than Bambi’ Foreign Policy, January-February 2005, p. 47; Robert Jervis ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2.1982, pp. 357-378; Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, pp. 211-239; Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring, 1984, pp. 287-304; Neo-classical realists include but are not limit to: Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: s Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing, International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Fall, 2004, pp. 159-201; FareedZakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November-December 1997, pp. 22-43; William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter, 1994-1995, pp. 91-129.
[2] Authors taking a liberalist approach to cooperation between states include, but are not limited to; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman ,(eds), The New European Community, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, iss. 4, December 1993, pp. 473-524; Brian L. Job, ‘Norms of Multilateralism in Regional Security: the Evolving Order of the Asia Pacific’, in International Norms: Origins, Significance and Manifestations, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1994; David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, (eds), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Press, 1997; Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 1-23; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’, International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Autumn 2004, pp. 85-120.
[3] Authors who have discussed security regimes include but are not limited to: Ernst B. Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 207-243; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 185-205; Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 325-355; Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324; Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’.; Oran R. Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 277-297; Donald J. Puchala, and Raymond F. Hopkins’, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 245-275 ;William R. Thompson, ‘The Regional Subsystem: a Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1973, pp. 89-117; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia’, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 31, iss. 3, 2000, pp. 223-247; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Eric Brahm, ‘International Regimes’, Beyond Intractability (eds) Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2005.
[4] Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 8.
[5] Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35 no. 2, 1991, p. 211-239.
[6] Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher developed this idea in 1950, and Albert W. Tucker coined the term in 1992. Briefly, imprisoned in separate cells in isolation to the other, two prisoners are given the choice of confessing to being party to the same crime or remaining silent; if one confesses and the other remains silent then all charges will be dropped but his/her testimony will be used against the other prisoner who will get a very stiff sentence. If both confess, then both face conviction but each gets a light sentence or parole. If both remain silent, both face moderate sentences. In other versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma, more moves, more players and asymmetric and single-person interpretations give a plethora of resulting relationships to assist strategic analysis of outcomes given rational verses irrational moves.
[7] Steven Kuhn, ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22 October 2007; Steve Smith, ‘Singing our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, ISA Presidential Address, February 2003; John Gerard Ruggie, Peter J. Katzenstein, Keohane, O. Robert and Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Transformations in World Politics; the Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, June 2005, pp. 271-296; Ernest B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 24.
[8] Sam Roggeveen, ‘Towards a Liberal Theory of International Relations’, Policy, The Centre for Independent Studies, Autumn, 2001, pp. 29-32.
[9] Stephen D. Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 127.
[10] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 49; Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hie Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, International Regimes, Spring, 1982, pp. 479-496; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984; Isabelle Grunberg, ‘Exploring the “myth” of hegemonic stability’, International Organization, vol. 44, no. 4, 1990, pp. 431-477.
[11] Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchical World’ International Organization vol. 36, no. 2 Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324; Stephen D. Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 125.
[12] Ernst B. Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes?’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 207-243.
[13] C. Raja Mohan, ‘Toward Cooperative Security in South Asia’, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, SAFMA Regional Conference, Dhaka, August 20-21, 2004.
[14] Jessica Byron, ‘CARICOM and Security Governance: Probing the Limits of Regional Cooperation’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton, San Francisco, 26 March 2008.
[15] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, 3rd edition, 2000; Joseph S. Nye Jr. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, 2004.
[16] Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ Foreign Policy, no. 110, Spring, 1998.
[17] Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Cornell University Press Ithica, 1982, pp. 196-198, in Sam Bateman, (ed.), Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 132, CSCAP, Australian National University, 1999, p. 32.
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