Chapter 2: Literature Review

By Timothy A. Martin (copyright 2011) 

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses cooperation from the perspective of security regimes. A wide range of complex ideas pertains to cooperation theories and security relations between states. Regime theories have not sat neatly within either realist[1] or liberalist[2] theoretical camps. The anomalous position of security regimes is partly due to its origins in Cold War strategic analysis, when new forms of cooperation to limit nuclear arms stockpiling necessitated alternate analytical pathways to prevailing realist theory. Even a non-traditional maritime security regime, that focuses on enforcement of law at sea has secondary elements of cooperation between states that have been described in terms of ‘security communities’ and ‘security alliances’, and an adaptation of economic regime formation through regionalism that attempt to explain why states do, or do not cooperate, on the issue of security at sea.

2.2 Cooperation and Security Regimes

Cold War Security Regimes

Discussion of security regimes originated in academic debates and criticisms about high security of strategic military issues during the final decades of the Cold War, rather than the low security of law enforcement at sea.[3] Discussions centred on cooperation between states on specific strategic security issues, such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I, 1972 and SALT II, 1979), that sought to manage nuclear ballistic missiles stockpiles and cooperate to reduce their proliferation. Despite criticisms that Cold War theories about international regimes have ambiguous terminologies and concepts, regime theory attempts to answer why states seek security cooperation despite the potential threat this poses to territorial sovereignty.[4] Study of security regimes sought to determine the nature of Cold War relations within a bi-polarised political-military system of states, investigating the potential for cooperation despite a high degree of insecurity.[5] Security regime theorists used conceptual games, such as the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, to gauge the probability of irrational decision-making by nuclear-armed actors despite the availability of other options, such as self-interest.[6] This conceptualisation posed problems of competition between potentially belligerent states, and trialled alternative possibilities of win-win or lose-lose, or win-lose outcomes, when actors adopted irrationality in their decision-making process.[7] In the post-Cold War era, in the absence of bi-polar power structures, analysis seeks to understand why states make decisions about security cooperation, when security is not an area of international relations towards which states are naturally inclined to cooperate on.

Since the end of the Second World War, the historical path of cooperation leads through international institutions and organisations, predominantly the United Nations. States made rational decisions that incorporated their independence and respect for their sovereignty. Although rationalists recognise anarchy as the defining characteristic of the international system, they also believe in international society, order and procedural structure. Traditions and institutions for the rationalist are important procedural frameworks; these have provided diplomacy, balance of power, international law and occasionally war.[8] Whereas liberal institutionalists reason that states seek absolute, win-win gains, realists argue that states seek relative, zero-sum gains. Regimes contain norms of behaviour and expectations, and actors weigh costs and benefits against objectives, such as improving security. Regimes arise, Stephen Krasner argues, because actors relinquish independent decision-making because out of self-interest, they seek to contend with the dilemmas of ‘common interests’ and ‘common aversions’.[9] Although none of the states within the Caribbean or Southeast Asian case studies has been at war with one another during the two decades covered by this thesis, tensions exist as they do in almost all regions where states interact; between those actors who have sought security cooperation and those that have not.

Divided into two main types, regimes characteristically are common interest or common aversion; each allows states to coordinate.[10] Common interest refers to states acting to ensure a certain outcome, collaborating in order to coordinate their efforts. In common aversion regimes, on the other hand, states refrain from certain behaviour in order to act jointly and positively for the purpose of the agreement, vesting institutions with monitoring and mediating powers in the event of conflict occurring. Common aversion regimes seek to avoid a certain outcome, even if they each have different overall strategic goals. In common aversion regimes, the outcome that actors can agree they do not want, can lead unlikely collaborators to form regimes.[11] An example of common aversion was the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States seeking to manage peacefully their competition during the Cold War. An example is the United Nations’ practice of ‘collective security’ and ‘common aversion’.[12] Collective security proposes that by states agreeing to come to each other’s aid in times of war, peace is assured. In the international system, where states are self-interested actors seeking to balance power, collective security allows states to place collective interests above national interests. For realists, however, this is a theory of how the world ought to be rather than the way the world actually is. Realists traditionally see conflict and power as natural conditions of the international system. Yet, the evolving nature of security has meant that ‘cooperative security’ acknowledges an increasing interdependence of states in areas such as economics and security.[13]

One of the similarities of different systems of states is that trade interdependence can provide regional actors with a certain level of confidence when discussions turn to security issues. Forums such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) do facilitate discussion on regional security matters.[14] Interdependence perspectives focus on the significance of states forming trade ties through such organisations that then pave the way for other relationships, such as security. A decline of military force and power balancing with the end of the Cold War, and a rise in economic and other forms of complex transnational connections between states has increased the likelihood of cooperation amongst regions of states; economic interdependence makes conflict too costly.[15] It merges realist and liberal perspectives, where relative gains of trade potentially lead to absolute gains in security. Interdependence theorists suggest a concept of ‘regimes’ which have cooperative structures that set rules and standards to govern specific sets of activities.[16] Regimes result when states form multilateral agreements in order to regulate their actions in support of a specific issue.[17] As intra-regional trade has grown, conflict becomes too costly, and resolution of low-security maritime threats is established through cooperation with trading partners. This neo-liberal vision of economic and other interaction provides avenues for peace that suggest the long-term stability that a security regime brings, but the fluidity of security alliances do not.

As states in one region engage in maritime law enforcement agreements with other major states, there may be more incentive for other regional actors to participate in similar arrangements, because the cost of participation may not appear to outweigh the expected benefits. States that take tentative steps to coordinate security at sea in seeking acceptable norms of behaviour from other participating states, point to a likelihood that risks to sovereignty are understood to be merely implied; perhaps by other actors who may be risk-averse. Oran Young argues a behavioural-legal connection that regimes encompass social institutions that govern the actions of states within specific issue areas in order to become ‘recognised patterns of behaviour or practise around which [actor] expectations converge’.[18] Stephen Krasner argues that regimes focus the behaviour of states around converging interests.[19] Robert Jervis seems to agree with Young and Krasner’s perspective that regimes influence and restrain the behaviour of participating states.[20]

For Jervis also, international law and behaviour intertwine. States participate in a collaborative endeavour where international regimes consist of ‘principles, rules and norms’ permitting them to ‘be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate’.[21] Arthur Stein appears to support Jervis and Krasner’s position, reasoning that regimes are an authority over or between states, defining national behaviour and shaping the way they interact.[22] Young appears to agree, arguing that, a regime exists when a collection of states come to agree on how the behaviour of participating actors is to be regulated in a specific area of interest.[23] Regimes offer the anarchical system of states (Christian Wolf’s natural, savage, ‘individuals’[24]) a sense of order out of a common need, according to Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan.[25] On the other hand, while Anthony Arend concurs with Young, he cautions that while states seek to regulate international issues by a common means this does not necessarily indicate that states have common interests.[26]

2.3 Situating Regimes within Theory

Stephen Walt argues the idea that realist theories were in some way redundant in the post-Cold War era is false, given the number of conflicts globally and suggests that realist theories about cooperation between states retain some relevance. For Walt, the study of contemporary international relations has been a drawn out contest between realist, liberal, and radical traditions but security regimes form a bridge between the first two.[27] Realists and liberalists perceive the causes of cooperation differently but security regimes are not exclusively situated within the liberal or realist camp. As a form of cooperation behaviour, regimes bear the hallmarks of both perspectives. Other perspectives, such as complex-interdependence, highlight the value of regimes in promoting the common economic interests of states that might in turn lead to confidence building, and security cooperation. Knowledge-based theories, such as constructivism and feminism primarily focus on the way that ideas and norms shape perceptions of international problems, highlighting the role of regimes in this process.[28]

From a realist perspective, states may see cooperation as a way to limit the power of neighbouring states, situating power as a central feature of states who seek to coordinate security. Whilst liberals seek to prevent conflict, realists see conflict between states as the norm.[29] It is also an argument about the potential for states to ‘pursue benign or bad ends through illegitimate or admirable means.’[30] Kenneth Waltz argues that states are egotistical actors who prioritise their own needs and interests.[31] Whilst Waltz’s structural realist perspective lacks Thomas Hobbes’ overarching sovereign authority,[32] it bears characteristic ‘fingerprints’ of both Thucydides[33] and late 19th century ‘Social Darwinism’[34] that proposed the strong inevitably surviving at the expense of the weak.

Realist and liberalist perspectives are comprised of a useful range of sub-theories about the way that states engage in security cooperation, and form a fundamental dichotomy of academic debate about the way that states relate, cooperate and change. However, while realists tend to focus on self-interest and power of the state; and liberals tend to focus on institutionalism and cooperation between states; regimes are situated somewhere in the middle of both camps. When discussing international society and conceptualising regimes, we are questioning the relationship between law and norms on the one hand, and power and interests on the other.[35] Robert Keohane places regimes in a managerial and ethical role, rather than the realist role where regimes are dependent on the presence of a strong state having hegemony for success. From the standpoint of realist theories about an anarchic international system, regimes are an anomaly, diverging from the idea that states are primarily self-interested.[36] Keohane reasons that liberalists envision economic interaction providing avenues for peace, rather than the fluidity of alliances that realists prefer, offering a more enduring path to cooperation between states. This includes interdependence, cooperative structures, and set rules and standards that govern specific sets of activities.[37] Therefore, regimes are guiding legal frameworks within which states agree to act, and Jervis describes them as the ‘principles, procedures, norms, or rules that govern particular issue areas ... global governance in an anarchical realm’.[38] Conversely, Hurrell reasons that rules and norms of international life purely reflect the power and interests of states.[39]Gregory Bruce Smith advocates a somewhat more Hobbesian view that human nature is at the heart of international relations and remains essentially unchanged, but he advocates that international politics remains flexible and adaptable to change.[40]

Since the end of the Cold War, theorists have sought to understand, and in some cases, to predict how states would behave; this had consequences for international relations and strategic planning, since the imperatives of bi-polarised power between the Soviet Union and United States had dissolved, leaving states to ponder on the question of security relations between states. In 1989, at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, Francis Fukuyama explored the possibility that ‘history’ had in a sense, come to an end and that realist ideas might be replaced by other perspectives, such as liberalism, as the dominant theoretical concepts for understanding relations between states. Fukuyama was debating the end of a conflict era and the possibility of increasing global cooperation. Drawing inspiration from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, Fukuyama reasoned that since international society had rejected other forms of political governance, such as monarchy, dictatorship and finally communism, ‘history’ may have in a sense ended and a final societal era begun, consisting of liberal idealism and market-oriented capitalism. Fukuyama hypothesised that in this new epoch, economic calculation, technical problem solving, environmental issues and consumer demand might create an era devoid of the dynamics of the past.[41]

Whereas realists have focussed on power, liberalists viewed collaboration succeeding if states were willing to lend legitimacy to initiatives that involve cooperation.[42] Liberalists seek a form of governance that offers individuals a chance to pursue their lives in the ‘neutral framework’ of international law through agreements and treaties, even though the concept of an ideal neutral framework has led realists to condemn liberalist perspectives.[43] In contrast to realists, liberalists see cooperation and collaboration between states to be ‘norms’ of behaviour. State behaviour is the origin of norms but ‘norms’ also influence and shape the behaviour of states. Norms are the behaviour of states that arise through negotiation, political interaction and self-promotion and meet the expectations of all actors involved.[44] Liberalists see a complex interdependence occurring between states, through trade and financial exchanges.[45] Whereas realist’s argue that states are not naturally inclined toward cooperation,[46] integration theorists, institutionalists and security cooperation theorists take the opposing view that weaker states fear the flexing of power of more powerful states and the threat this poses to sovereignty.[47] Consequently, weaker states and states that are more powerful have historically utilised institutions or legal frameworks for different reasons. Weaker states seek to minimise threats to sovereignty. States that are more powerful seek to apply power while avoiding both sanctions and war.[48]

2.4 Linking ‘Insecurity’ and ‘Region’

Insecurity

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 suggested that Samuel Huntington’s premise that Eastern and Western cultures would engage in a new era of insecurity was at least reasonable.[49] However, while Fukuyama had questioned realist positions in the changing context of the post-Cold War era and welcomed a new era of liberal cooperation between nations, John Mearsheimer maintained that states instinctively distrust one another. Mearsheimer saw the end of the Cold War as a part of the cycle of peace and conflict. From this alternative perspective of change, globalisation was merely an interval before states once again go head to head when power imbalances initiated conflict once more.[50] Fukuyama and Huntington were essentially saying similar things about global security. International security was undergoing change, and therefore changing relations between states. This change could be put down to two major events, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the war on terror in late 2001. Mearsheimer saw change as cyclic, and dips in the level of global conflict were the norms of international relations historically. Each of the authors argued that international security was undergoing changes precipitated by major security events.

For states to cooperate on security, where a high degree of trust is crucial, concerns about the integrity of territorial sovereignty permeate all security agreements including non-traditional maritime security. Sovereignty remains a fundamental basis for the existence of nation states. The principles ensconced within the conventions, codes and treaties that comprise the bulk of international law, and the ideals that premise the function of the United Nations, all indicate hallmarks of Kantian idealism; that policymakers and lawmakers must hear differences between states and make appropriate decisions that are founded on accepted, international law.[51] Immanuel Kant argued that the sovereignty of states is absolute, and upholding this right is a means to avoiding conflict but that governments must make morally guided decisions when constructing ‘universal law’.[52] Hobbes argued pragmatically that the application of reason balanced natural aggression; that an authority guides the way that societies act and promotes common strength and unity.[53] This proposes the incorporation of morality and reason into decision-making processes, an epistemological reasoning that instead of using analysis or experience to mould our concepts to the character of objects, the structure of our concepts should shape how we perceive objects. In this perspective, new knowledge and experience shape the world rather than simply describing it.[54] A counter-argument is that human behaviour is an irrational element in otherwise rational processes.[55] Rationality acts as a gradual elimination process, removing status, passions and prejudices from government decision-making, aiming for ‘systematic calculation and evidence-based reflection’.[56] Nevertheless, human behaviour transforms the world, so that interaction relies on our changing understandings of real world events.[57]

Significance of ‘Region’ in Regime Building

During the Cold War the great powers intervened in regions at the expense of opposing powers and weak regional states, so that authority was imposed. The realities of structure and politics of regional organisation during the Cold War meant that managing regional security could only have limited success.[58] According to Joseph Nye, during the bi-polarised security parameters of the Cold War, only two types of regional organisation were of consequence. First, a group of states with a continental or hemispheric basis, a set of decision-making institutions where the procedures for conflict resolution had been established; and second, collective defence establishments with a geographic basis ‘conforming to strategic needs rather than natural boundaries’, and whose countries were underdeveloped (for example, NATO, SEATO[59] and the Warsaw Pact).[60] William Thompson has defined a regional system, or ‘sub-system’ as a geographic collection of states whose proximity to one another indicates that incidents affecting one state probably affect neighbouring states as well. Thompson considered that most theories pertaining to regional systems concentrated on those interrelationships where all actors display a particular degree of constancy and intensity, and whereby the actions of one actor affects all other actors in that system. For Thompson, the foreign policies of great powers during the Cold War had given the impression that regional sub-systems did not exist or not taken seriously.[61] However, in the post-Cold War era, more significance is placed on recognition by the international community, as well as by the regional actors themselves of the extent of a given geographic regional structure.

In the 1990s a sense that regions were becoming important in some way, emerged through efforts to understand the behaviour of international actors in those areas where the flow of international trade was strategically significant to the global economic paradigm.[62] Immanuel Kant argued that spatial representation of objects is an important means of understanding them. For Kant, it is important to delineate the region of space that an object occupies. Failing this spatial depiction, sensations of the observer remain undifferentiated, making it difficult to ascribe specific properties to particular objects, such as a geographic area. According to Kant, observing an object that persistently occupies an area over a period consolidates a spatial awareness.[63] In other words, a region needs boundaries and positioning on a map or chart, and observation over time. Peter Katzenstein appears to adopt Kantian reasoning by disputing that a region is simply a given territorial entity constituted by certain physical facts, but instead ‘the creation of political power and purpose’.[64] Joseph Camilleri places importance on distinguishing between endogenous influences––those from inside a region, such as geography and demography, or history and political culture, and exogenous influences––those from outside a region, which may include the policies of states, transnational corporations, financial markets, international governmental institutions or non-governmental organisations. However, Camilleri considers that when it comes to security, member states of a region probably focus on the strategic interests of external states. Camilleri argues the key variables for the occurrence of regionalization, are the way that power is configured within and between an area; the axes of conflict internal or external to an area; the degree of cohesion and homogeneity in intra-regional relationships; and whether a region is relatively open or closed to external states.[65] A growing expansion of regional relations has meant that regions increasingly became significant places of conflict and cooperation.[66] Regionalism previously focussed on the way that states within a particular region developed cooperative, economic-based interrelationships, where mutual development could overcome politics and conflict.[67] For Björn Hettne, a regional approach to security infers that regional cooperation reduces the potential for conflict; the dividend of peace is that it facilitates development cooperation. A win-win outcome results from regional collaboration; that is, increased levels of regional action by governments wanting cooperation, and accepting a measure of externally imposed regimes, economic policies and security arrangements.[68] Regionalism emerged in the post-Cold War era through efforts to understand the behaviour of actors in regions where international trade has strategic significance. Jervis points out that, security-oriented regimes are more difficult to establish than economic regimes due to, ‘inherently competitive cast of many security concerns, the unforgiving nature of the problems, and the difficulty in determining how much security the state has or needs’.[69] However, regionalism can emphasise a ‘top to bottom’ approach to cooperation, where states are the main actors making decisions about security cooperation, and regional integration involves states within a specified region reaching a political consensus.[70] In the post-Cold War era, regionalism links to globalization and associates state and non-state actors as significant participants through trade but can lead to other forms of interaction on issues such as security. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are both regional organisations that have a primary focus on trade but with core commitments to respecting the sovereignty of fellow member states and both have been forums for discussing security.

Whereas regionalism had emphasised a ‘top to bottom’ approach, where states were the main actors ascertaining what regional cooperation mechanisms would be, neo-realism’s regional integration involves states within a specified region reaching a political consensus.[71] New-regionalism positions non-state actors as significant participants in regionalization processes. For Hettne, regionalism is a qualitatively new phenomenon, emerging with globalization; both ‘the two processes of globalization and regionalization … are articulated within the same larger process of global structural change’.[72] Hettne considers three ways to regional collaboration; first, increased levels of ‘regionness’ by governments wanting cooperation; second, accepting a measure of externally imposed regimes, economic policies and security arrangements; or third, a passive integration route. Hettne focuses on a regional approach of prevention, regarding policing, so that ‘regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation’.[73]

Adopting a Kantian reasoning, Peter Katzenstein argues that a region is not simply a given territorial entity constituted by certain physical facts, but is a creation of ‘political power and purpose’.[74] Regionalism is related to what Hettne, and Fredrik Söderbaumterm the ‘structural transformation of the world’, indicated by four significant events.[75] First, the change from bi-polarity towards multi-polarity, that affects the way that power and labour is distributed. Second, that the attitude of the United States is changing as its hegemony declines so that regionalism is regarded as less of a threat to its ability to project power. Third, that the ‘Westphalian’ nation-state system is wearing away while global interdependence between states (globalisation) is increasingly widespread, a point supported by Krasner. Their fourth point relates to globalising forces.[76] Camilleri places importance on distinguishing between endogenous influences - those from inside a region, such as geography and demography, or history and political culture, and exogenous influences - those from outside a region that may include the policies of states, transnational corporations, financial markets, international governmental institutions or non-governmental organisations.

Key international actors and institutions have played key roles in shaping the way that states have negotiated on trade but more significantly, how they have negotiated on security. In particular, the United Nations and the United States are most significant in the context of these regions. Camilleri argues that when it comes to security, member states of a region focus on the strategic interests of external states but organisations within the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, such as CARICOM and ASEAN, create a means by which states can negotiate intra-regionally. Camilleri argues the key variables for regionalisation are four-fold. They are the way that power is configured within and between an area; the axis of conflict internal or external to an area; the degree of cohesion and homogeneity in intra-regional relationships; and whether a region is relatively open or closed to the input of external states.[77] Jana Dorband claims that the role of a global hegemonic power in regional geopolitical order is a crucial analytical variable.[78] Therefore, any discussion about international law and sovereignty must include the United States since it has shaped both the interests and capacities of regional states and promoted respect for the rule of law. As the United States fundamental abiding principles imply no compromise of morality and law, it therefore encompasses a respect for sovereignty. A respect for sovereignty is a fundamental tenet of international conventions, codes and treaties created within the United Nations. Therefore, discussions about security cooperation between states, international law and sovereignty must include the institution of the United Nations.



[1] Authors taking a realist approach to cooperation between states include, but are not limited to: Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, The State, and War, NY, Columbia University Press, 1959; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer, 2000, pp. 5-41; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Better to Be Godzilla Than Bambi’ Foreign Policy, January-February 2005, p. 47; Robert Jervis ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2.1982, pp. 357-378; Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, pp. 211-239; Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring, 1984, pp. 287-304; Neo-classical realists include but are not limit to: Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered Threats: s Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing, International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Fall, 2004, pp. 159-201; FareedZakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November-December 1997, pp. 22-43; William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter, 1994-1995, pp. 91-129.
[2] Authors taking a liberalist approach to cooperation between states include, but are not limited to; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffman ,(eds), The New European Community, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, iss. 4, December 1993, pp. 473-524; Brian L. Job, ‘Norms of Multilateralism in Regional Security: the Evolving Order of the Asia Pacific’, in International Norms: Origins, Significance and Manifestations, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1994; David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, (eds), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Press, 1997; Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 1-23; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’, International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Autumn 2004, pp. 85-120.
[3] Authors who have discussed security regimes include but are not limited to: Ernst B. Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 207-243; Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 185-205; Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 325-355; Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324; Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’.; Oran R. Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 277-297; Donald J. Puchala, and Raymond F. Hopkins’, International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 245-275 ;William R. Thompson, ‘The Regional Subsystem: a Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1973, pp. 89-117; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia’, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 31, iss. 3, 2000, pp. 223-247; Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Eric Brahm, ‘International Regimes’, Beyond Intractability (eds) Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, September 2005.
[4] Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 8.
[5] Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35 no. 2, 1991, p. 211-239.
[6] Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher developed this idea in 1950, and Albert W. Tucker coined the term in 1992. Briefly, imprisoned in separate cells in isolation to the other, two prisoners are given the choice of confessing to being party to the same crime or remaining silent; if one confesses and the other remains silent then all charges will be dropped but his/her testimony will be used against the other prisoner who will get a very stiff sentence. If both confess, then both face conviction but each gets a light sentence or parole. If both remain silent, both face moderate sentences. In other versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma, more moves, more players and asymmetric and single-person interpretations give a plethora of resulting relationships to assist strategic analysis of outcomes given rational verses irrational moves.
[7] Steven Kuhn, ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22 October 2007; Steve Smith, ‘Singing our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, ISA Presidential Address, February 2003; John Gerard Ruggie, Peter J. Katzenstein, Keohane, O. Robert and Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Transformations in World Politics; the Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, June 2005, pp. 271-296; Ernest B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 24.
[8] Sam Roggeveen, ‘Towards a Liberal Theory of International Relations’, Policy, The Centre for Independent Studies, Autumn, 2001, pp. 29-32.
[9] Stephen D. Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 127.
[10] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 49; Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hie Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, International Regimes, Spring, 1982, pp. 479-496; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984; Isabelle Grunberg, ‘Exploring the “myth” of hegemonic stability’, International Organization, vol. 44, no. 4, 1990, pp. 431-477.
[11] Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchical World’ International Organization vol. 36, no. 2 Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324; Stephen D. Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 125.
[12] Ernst B. Haas, ‘Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes?’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 207-243.
[13] C. Raja Mohan, ‘Toward Cooperative Security in South Asia’, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, SAFMA Regional Conference, Dhaka, August 20-21, 2004.
[14] Jessica Byron, ‘CARICOM and Security Governance: Probing the Limits of Regional Cooperation’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Hilton, San Francisco, 26 March 2008.
[15] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, 3rd edition, 2000; Joseph S. Nye Jr. Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, 2004.
[16] Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ Foreign Policy, no. 110, Spring, 1998.
[17] Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Cornell University Press Ithica, 1982, pp. 196-198, in Sam Bateman, (ed.), Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and Prospects, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 132, CSCAP, Australian National University, 1999, p. 32.
[18] Oran R. Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes’ International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 277-297.
[19] Stephen Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 2; Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach and M. Scott, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations/Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach and M. Scott Solomon, Routledge, UK, 2009, pp. 45-48.
[20] Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 357-378.
[21] Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in Stephen Krasner, (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithica, 1983, p. 2.
[22] Arthur A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, International Organization, no. 36, Spring, 1982, pp. 299-324.
[23] Oran R. Young, International Cooperation for Natural Resources’.
[24] Christian Wolff, Jus GentiumMethodoScientificaPertractatum (The Law of Nations According to the Scientific Method) (translated by) Joseph Drake, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934, in Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, ‘Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, p. 280-304.
[25] Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2002, pp. 135-37.
[26] David J. Bederman, Review Essay, ‘Constructivism, Positivism and Empiricism in International Law’, Georgetown Law Journal, January 2001, p. 469-499.[Review of Anthony C. Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, 1999.]
[27] Stephen M. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy, no.110, ‘Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge’ Spring, 1998, pp. 29-32 and 34-46.
[28] Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan, Key Concepts, p. 273.
[29] Stephen M. Walt, ‘One World, Many Theories’.
[30] David J. Bederman, ‘Constructivism, Positivism’.
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